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Abstract. Security breaches often arise as a result of users’ failure to
comply with security policies. Such failures to comply may simply be in-
nocent mistakes. However, there is evidence that, in some circumstances,
users choose not to comply because they perceive that the security ben-
efit of compliance is outweighed by the cost that is the impact of compli-
ance on their abilities to complete their operational tasks. That is, they
perceive security compliance as hindering their work. The ‘compliance
budget’ is a concept in information security that describes how the users
of an organization’s systems determine the extent to which they comply
with the specified security policy. The purpose of this paper is to initiate
a qualitative logical analysis of, and so provide reasoning tools for, this
important concept in security economics for which quantitative analysis
is difficult to establish. We set up a simple temporal logic of preferences,
with a semantics given in terms of histories and sets of preferences, and
explain how to use it to model and reason about the compliance budget.
The key ingredients are preference update, to account for behavioural
change in response to policy change, and an ability to handle uncer-
tainty, to account for the lack of quantitative measures.
1 Introduction
The security of systems is not simply a technical problem. While encryption, ro-
bust protocols, verified code, and network defences are critical aspects of system
security, the behaviour of system managers and users, and the policies that are
intended to manage their behaviour, are also of critical importance.
Many security breaches are the result of users’ failure to comply with security
policies. Failure to comply may simply be the result of a mistake, because of a
misunderstanding, or derive from users’ being required to form an effectively
impossible task.
In recent years, many effective tools for analysing security behaviour and
investments have been provided by economics, beginning with significant work
by Anderson and Moore [2,3], explaining the relevance of economics to informa-
tion security, and Gordon and Loeb [11,12], considering optimal investment in
information security. Since then, there has been a vast development in security
economics, too extensive to survey in this short paper. Game theory and decision
theory have been significant parts of this development; see, for example, [1,22],
and much more besides. Some of us have contributed to the use of methods from
economics to assess the role of public policy in the management of information
security [18] and in system management policy [15,17].
A key aspect of the management of system security policies concerns the
relationship between the human users of systems and the security policies with
which they are expected to comply. This relationship has been explored, in the
context of security economics, by Beautement et al. [6,7] through the concept of
the compliance budget. The idea here is that users have a limited appetite for
engagement in the behaviour that is required in order to ensure compliance with
policy if that behaviour detracts from their primary operational tasks.
In Section 2, we explain the concept of the compliance budget as introduced
in [6,7], building on earlier work in [8]. In Section 3, we introduce a simple
temporal logic with a semantics that is based on histories of events and agents’
preferences. In Section 4, we consider an example of how agents’ behaviour can
be understood in terms of the compliance budget and reasoned about logically.
In Section 5, we consider our model of the compliance behaviour in the context
of incomplete information, and briefly set out a programme of further work.
This paper is intended to be conceptual rather than technical in nature and,
to this end, we deliberately employ a slightly informal style. Its purpose is to ini-
tiate a qualitative logical analysis of an important concept in security economics
for which quantitative analysis is difficult to establish. We are not aware of any
related work on logical analyses of the compliance budget or similar concepts.
This work was supported by UK EPSRC EP/K033042/1 and EP/K033247/1.
2 The compliance budget
Organizations’ security policies are enforced using tools of different kinds, rang-
ing from simple instructions from managers through to complex combinations
of hardware, software, and tokens. For example, access control via ‘something
you are, something you have, and something you know’. In situations in which
non-compliance with the policy is possible, most of an organization’s employees
will nevertheless comply provided compliance does not require additional effort.
If extra effort is required, individuals will weigh this extra effort, and the
opportunity cost that it implies in terms of their production task, against the
benefits they obtain from compliance. If there is good alignment (i.e., of in-
centives) between the individual’s goals as an employee and the organization’s
goals, then there will be little or no conflict as the behaviour required from the
individual for compliance causes no friction.
However, most individuals will tend not to choose to comply with the secu-
rity behaviour required by an organization if that behaviour conflicts with the
behaviour that they perceive to be required in order to achieve their own goals.
In such a situation, goals are less likely to be met and and effort is likely to be
wasted. This benefit-cost analysis is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. The relationship between the perceived cost to an individual of compliance
and the effectiveness of a security policy [6,7]. More effective policies achieve greater
effectiveness at a given cost to an individual.
Alternative rates of compliance expenditure are also shown for comparison.
Once the compliance threshold is crossed security effectiveness drops sharply as
employees elect to complete tasks that benefit them more directly as individu-
als rather than security tasks that more benefit the organization as a whole. A
well-managed budget will spend perceived effort at a slower rate, so that more se-
curity policies can be accommodated before the compliance threshold is reached,
resulting in a higher level of achieved security. If the limit is exceeded, security
policies are less likely to be followed; achieved levels of security will decline.
Following [6,7], we remark that, in the absence of quantitative data, the pre-
cise shape of the graph in Figure 1 cannot be plotted precisely. Moreover, there
will be variations from individual to individual, although the same core features
will occur. These behaviours have been investigated in extensive empirical stud-
ies [8,6,7], supporting the formulation of the concept of the compliance budget.
3 A logic for the compliance budget
In this section, we introduce a (multi-modal) temporal logic of preferences with
which we can reason about the compliance budget. For convenience, we name
the logic CBL, for ‘compliance budget logic’.
The logic includes temporal modalities, modalities for agents’ preferences,
and a modality for preference update [5]. Each modality has a specific role in
our modelling of reasoning about the compliance budget.
– The temporal modalities,© (next time step) and U (until) are familiar from
temporal logic [21] (see [14] for a tutorial exposition) and are used to reason
about how properties of the system change over time.
– The modality ♦i, together with its dual i, is used to reason about the
preferences of the agents (or principals, or players) i in a system. It denotes
decision-making capability between outcomes with different ‘worth’ to the
agents in the system.
– The modality [!Φ], for a finite set of formulae Φ, is reminiscent of the key
modality in public announcement logic (see, e.g., [10] for a convenient sum-
mary); it is used to reason about how the preferences of agents in the system
are changed by the imposition of policies by those who manage the system.
The semantics of the logic is specified in terms of history-based structures [20],
and is explained below. Histories (sequences of events) can be used to represent
the trace semantics of complex systems models, and can be seen as a simple
version of the process-theoretic models explored in, for example, [9].
Definition 1 (Syntax of CBL). Given a set of propositional variables P, with
elements p, q, etc., the syntax of the logic CBL is defined as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | > | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | φ→ φ classical propositionals
| ©φ | φ U φ temporal modalities
| ♦iφ | iφ | [!Φ]φ preference modalities.
We write formulae as φ, ψ, etc., and finite sets of formulae as Φ, Ψ, etc.. The
existential preference modal operator for agent i is ♦iφ. The dual universal
preference modal operator for agent i is iφ. When there is only a single agent
in the system, we sometimes drop the agent annotation. The temporal ‘next-
time’ operator is ©φ. The temporal ‘until’ operator is φ U ψ.
The preference update modality — which updates agents’ preferences — is
written [!Φ]φ and denotes that φ holds when the model is updated to disregard
preferences between pairs of histories that (respectively) do and do not satisfy
some formula in Φ. We refer to a formula as update-free if it contains no uses of
the preference update modality.
The compliance budget [6,7] is qualitative rather than quantitative concept,
and accepts that accurate measures of the effort taken to follow a given policy,
and the effort that an employee has to expend, can generally not be practically
obtained. As a result, a preference update consists of a set of formulae according
to which the preferences are updated without any formal notion of likelihood
or probability between the different facts; that is, it is a qualitative update to
preferences rather than a quantitative update. The preference-update modality
[!Φ] will be used to give a logical account of the behavioural changes brought
about by the implementation of a policy. The set of formulae Φ represents the
impact on agents’ decision-making under a new policy; we allow Φ to be a
finite set rather than a single formula in order to incorporate uncertainty in this
decision-making impact. This set-up will be essential to our logical description
of the compliance budget.
First, we need some notation. Let E be the set of events (the ‘global event
set of a model’) and A be the set of agents of a history-based model.
A history H over a set of events E is a possibly infinite sequence of events
drawn from the set E .  denotes the empty history.
H, t |=M p iff Ht is defined and Ht ∈ V(p)
H, t |=M ⊥ never H, t |=M > always H, t |=M ¬φ iff H, t 6|=M φ
H, t |=Mφ∨ψ iff H, t |=Mφ orH, t |=Mψ H, t |=Mφ∧ψ iff H, t |=Mφ andH, t |=Mψ
H, t |=M ©φ iff H, t+ 1 |=M φ
H, t |=M φ U ψ iff there exists k ∈ N such that t ≤ k, H, k |=M ψ
and, for all l ∈ N, t ≤ l < k implies H, l |=M φ
H, t |=M ♦iφ iff there exist H ′ ∈ H and pi ∈ Π
HpiiH
′, and H ′, t |=M φ
H, t |=M iφ iff for all H ′ ∈ H and all pi ∈ Π,
HpiiH
′ implies H ′, t |=M φ
H, t |=M [!Φ]φ iff H, t |=M[!Φ,t] φ
Fig. 2. Satisfaction relation
If a history H is of at least length m ∈ N, then let H(m) be the mth element
of the sequence, Hm be the m-length prefix of the history. We emphasize that a
history is finite using lower case. Let h;H denote the concatenation of a finite
history h with a (possibly infinite) history H. In this case, we say that h is a
prefix of h;H. (Note that ;H = H.)
A protocol H is a set of histories closed under finite prefix.
Definition 2. A preference relation ≺ is a strict partial order on a protocol.
In a system with multiple agents, we use a different preference relation for
each agent, to describe their separate interests. Such a collection of preferences
is specified as a preference structure.
Definition 3 (Preference structure). A preference structure for agents A
over histories H is given by a tuple (≺1, . . . ,≺n), where A = {1, . . . , n}, and,
for all i ∈ A, ≺i is a preference relation on the protocol H.
We write preference structures pi, pi′, etc., and sets of preference structures Π,
Π ′, etc..
We can now define models of CBL. Satisfaction and model update are defined
mutually inductively.
Definition 4 (History-based preference models). A tuple (E ,A,H,V, Π)
is a history-based preference model (HBPM), or a history-based model for short,
if E is a set of events, A = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, H is a protocol, V is
a valuation function from propositions to subsets of H containing only finite
histories, and Π is a set of preference structures for agents A over H.
Models are denoted M, M′, etc.. The interpretation of the connectives and
modalities is given in Figure 2, where satisfaction of a formula φ in history
H at time t in a model M is written H, t M φ. Note that the semantics of
preference update depends on the definition of preference-based model update,
which is explained below. The necessary model update, as defined in Definition 6,
requires only the strictly smaller formula φ.
The modality ♦iφ denotes the existence of a history (trace) that is preferred
by agent i in some possible preference relation and in which φ holds. The modal-
ity©φ denotes that φ holds at the next time point. The modality φU ψ denotes
that φ holds until some time point, at which ψ holds.
In order to reason about the impact of a policy, it is helpful to be able to
modify the preferences of the principals in the logic. This can be modelled us-
ing preference updates, which can remove (but cannot add) preferences between
pairs of histories. A preference update is performed using a distinguishing for-
mula, φ. Given two histories H,H ′, if H, t |=M φ but H ′, t 6|=M φ, then we
call φ a ‘distinguishing formula’ for (H, t) and (H ′, t). In this case, preference
update for agent i leads to a new preference relation ≺′i such that H 6≺′i H ′. The
notion of preference update in history-based models that we use in this paper
was introduced in [5].
Definition 5 (Preference relation update). Let ≺ be a preference relation
and M = (E ,A,H,V, Π) be a history-based model. The preference relation up-
dated according to a formula φ at time t, ≺φ,M,t, is defined as
≺φ,M,t := ≺ \{(H,H ′) | H, t |=Mφ and H ′, t 6|=M φ},
Lemma 1. If M = (E ,A,H,V, Π) is a history-based model, ≺ is a preference
relation over histories H, φ is a formula, and t is a time-point, then ≺φ,M,t is
a preference relation over histories H.
Proof. Establishing this amounts to checking that the given relation is transitive.
Suppose H ≺φ,M,t H ′ ≺φ,M,t H ′′. If H, t |=M φ, then H ′, t |=M φ, so that
H ′′, t |=M φ. Therefore H ≺φ,M,t H ′′.
We extend updates of preference relations pointwise to updates of preference
structures. We can then use preference relation update to update a model using
a finite set of distinguishing formulae.
Definition 6 (Preference-based model update). Let M = (E ,A,H,V, Π)
be a history-based preference model. The updated preference modelM[!Φ, t] (with
respect to a finite set of distinguishing non-updating formulae Φ and time-point
t) is defined as M[!Φ, t] = (E ,A,H,V, {piφ,M,t | pi ∈ Π and φ ∈ Φ}).
We represent a preference update within the logic via the [!Φ] modality.
Given a model M and a finite set of distinguishing non-updating formulae Φ, a
preference update modality is satisfied by history H at time t in modelM (i.e.,
H, t |=M [!Φ]ψ), if and only if ψ holds in the model updated by Φ at time-point
t (i.e., H, t |=M[!Φ,t] ψ).
Proposition 1. The logic CBL as defined in Figure 2, together with the sup-
porting definitions, is a conservative extension of the temporal fragment (classical
propositionals and temporal modalities) without the preference fragment (prefer-
ence modalities, ♦iφ, iφ, [!Φ]φ).
Proof. Consider that all of the satisfaction clauses for the temporal modalities
are independent of the structures required to define the preference modalities.
Example 1. Suppose a set of events E = {c, d}, denoting compliance and devia-
tion from management-desired behaviour, and a set of histories of all traces over
the events of at most length two, that is H = {, c, d, (c; c), (c; d), (d; c), (d; d)}.
We consider only one agent in the system, an employee (that is, A = {1}).
The employee always prefers to deviate; that is, pi = (≺) is given by the transitive
closure of
c ≺ d c; c ≺ c; d c; c ≺ d; c c; d ≺ d; d d; c ≺ d; d.
Let pc be a proposition that holds for a history when the last event in its
sequence is c; that is, h ∈ V(pc) if and only if h is of the form h′; c. Let pd be
defined similarly.
Let M = (E ,A,H,V, {pi}). We can use the logic CBL to say that the em-
ployee prefers to deviate from the behaviour desired by the manager at the first
opportunity; that is, (c; c), 0 M ♦1© pd.
Suppose the policy-maker introduces incentives to encourage greater com-
pliance with policy. In CBL, this is modelled as a preference update with the
formula φ =©pc. Updating the preferences using this formula results in ≺φ,M,0,
consisting in just
c; c ≺φ,M,0 c; d d; c ≺φ,M,0 d; d.
This update removes the employee’s preference to deviate at the first opportu-
nity, but not at later opportunities; formally, (c; c), 0 M [!{φ}]¬♦1© pd.
To deal with the second opportunity to deviate from policy, let ψ =©©pc.
Updating the original preferences using this formula results in ≺ψ,M,0 , given by
c ≺ψ,M,0 d c; c ≺ψ,M,0 d; c c; d ≺ψ,M,0 d; d.
This update removes the employee’s preference to deviate at the second oppor-
tunity, but not at other opportunities; formally, (c; c), 0 M [!{ψ}]¬♦1©©pd.
In some situations, the policy-maker may have less fine-grained control over
the employees. For example, they can prevent one deviation, but have no control
over which deviation is prevented. This is represented by updating the prefer-
ences using the set of formulae Φ = {φ, ψ}, resulting in the two possible pref-
erence relations above; that is, M[!Φ,0] = (E ,A,H,V, {≺φ,M,0,≺ψ,M,0}). This
update removes the employee’s preference to deviate twice. However, there is
now uncertainty about the preferences, and properties that hold for updates
according to φ and ψ no longer hold. Indeed,
(c; c), 0 M [!Φ]♦1© pd and (c; c), 0 M [!Φ]♦1©©pd.
We do, however, have the weaker property, that the employee does not prefer
to deviate at both opportunities; formally,
(c; c), 0 M [!Φ]¬♦1((©pd) ∧ (©© pd)).
To see this, note that the only histories preferable to c; c are c; d, from the update
for φ, and d; c, from the update for ψ, and (c; d), 0 6|=M[!Φ,0] ((©pd)∧ (©© pd))
and (d; c), 0 6|=M[!Φ,0] ((©pd) ∧ (©© pd)). uunionsq
Building on this set-up, we now introduce a logical model of the compliance
budget. To this end, we let loadn(φ, i) denote that agent i has at least n distinct
situations in which it would prefer to violate the policy φ.
Definition 7. Let i be an agent and φ be an update-free formula. The load
formulae of these parameters are defined by
load0(φ, i) , >
loadn+1(φ, i) , (φ ∧iφ) U
(
φ ∧ ♦i¬φ ∧© loadn(φ, i)
)
.
Given a load formula loadn(φ, i), we refer to n as the load value, and φ as the
policy. The intuition for this is that if loadn(φ, i) holds, agent i has complied
with policy φ, but would have preferred to deviate on n occasions, so expending
compliance budget.
If we perform a preference update according to the formula loadn(φ, i), we will
remove the preference to deviate from the policy φ at the first n opportunities.
We can represent a bound on uncertainty on an agent’s compliance budget —
that is, uncertainty on how much more the agent will comply with policies —
by updating according to a set of load formulae with a range of load values:
loadm(φ, i), loadm+1(φ, i), . . . , loadn−1(φ, i), loadn(φ, i).
4 An access control example
We illustrate the facility to model ideas from the compliance budget using an
example concerning remote access policy. We suppose a business setting, with an
internal (local) network that contains some core systems resources (for example,
databases, workflow tools, or email servers). This core system can be divided
into high security and low security components, where high security components
are more valuable or more vulnerable.
Principals using devices on the local network can access the entire core sys-
tem, both high and low security. Principals using devices on remote networks
can access the core system, but with certain restrictions based on the type of
connection that is used to access the resources.
The system is technologically configured so that a connection using a virtual
private network (VPN) can access the whole core system, but a connection using
a secure shell (SSH) can only access the low-security component of the core
system. This is an attempted implementation of the (currently informal) policy
that the high-security component of the core system should only be remotely
accessed via VPN. Principals can, however, use SSH to connect to locally owned
machines, and then connect directly to the high component of the core system.
Hence, the policy can be circumvented by a determined principal.
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Fig. 3. Access control from a remote network
This scenario is depicted graphically in Figure 3. To model this, we consider
the policy-maker M , and the employee (principal) P . We assume a set of events
E , comprising: ccloc, ccV , and ccS , connecting to the core system via the local
network, VPN, and SSH; dcloc, dcV , and dcS , disconnecting from the core system
via the local network, VPN, and SSH; cdS and ddS , connecting to and discon-
necting from an employee-controlled device on the local network via SSH; and
aL and aH , accessing the low- and high-security component of the core system.
The technological configuration places various constraints on the behaviour
of the system, represented by the set of histories that we consider, H. An access
event e occurs within the scope of a connection event e′ within a history h if
and only if there exist histories h1, h2, h3 such that h = h1; e
′;h2; e;h3 and h2
does not contain any connect or disconnect events. For example, the aL event
does occur within the scope of the ccS event in the history ccS ; aL, but does not
occur within the scope of ccS event in the history ccS ; dcS ; aL.
The set of histories contains all finite sequences of the events, except for those
where some aL event does not occur within the scope of a connection ccloc, ccV ,
or ccS , and those where some aH event does not occur within the scope of a
connection ccloc or ccV . For example, the history ccS ; aH is not included inH, but
the histories ccV ; aH and cdS ; ccloc; aH are included in H. The history ccV ; aH
conforms to the informal policy that the high security component of the core
system should only be remotely accessed via VPN. The history cdS ; ccloc; aH ,
however, does not conform to the informal policy, but it is included in our set
of histories H as the aH event does occur within the scope of a connection ccloc.
There are various costs and benefits to the employee for their different ac-
tions/events that they can choose. Working locally (on site) gives direct, secure
access, but comes with the possibility, for example, of being interrupted by a
colleague. Working remotely removes the possibility of being interrupted, but
requires accessing the core system via some additional security mechanism. Us-
ing a VPN to connect remotely to the core system gives full, secure access, but
has the costs that the VPN is harder (than SSH) to operate, is more faulty (than
SSH), and removes the ability, for example, to use a printer on the remote net-
work. Using SSH to connect remotely to the core system gives secure access and
is easier (than the VPN) to operate, is less faulty (than the VPN), and retains
the ability to use a printer on the remote network, but has the cost that it has
limited access only to the low security component of the core system.
We demonstrate how to model the imposition of a policy that explicitly guides
against using SSH to access the core system. In the remainder of this section, we
overload our syntax slightly and use an event e as a proposition which is satisfied
by a history if and only if the last event in the history is the given event. The
histories that comply with this policy are those that satisfy
φ , (cdS → ((¬ccloc) U ddS)
at every time step. Note that a finer-grained policy that only prohibits the use of
such connections to access high-security resources could be described similarly.
Consider a user working at a remote site, engaged in a task which requires two
accesses to the high-security resources at base, with intervening access to remote-
site resources that are not available when connected via VPN. As described
above, we endow the user with a preference relation favouring SSH connections
above VPN: ccV ; aH ; dcV ≺ cdS ; ccloc; aH ; dcloc; ddS (and similarly for longer
histories containing these as subsequences). The user may complete the task
with any of the following three histories:
ccV ; aH ; dcV ; ccV ; aH ; dcV (1)
≺ ccV ; aH ; dcV ; cdS ; ccloc; aH ; dcloc; ddS (2)
≺ cdS ; ccloc; aH ; aH ; dcloc; ddS . (3)
Consider a model M that embodies this scenario. To model the imposition
of the access control policy, we perform preference update according to the set of
formulae Φ , {loadi(φ) | i = 1, 2}, arriving at model M′ ,M[!Φ] This update
reflects the policy-maker’s inevitable uncertainty in the compliance budget of
the user. Because of the user’s prior preference, compliance with policy φ comes
at a cost. Some of this cost is directly observable: witness the disconnections
and reconnections in history (1), the least-preferred, most-compliant behaviour.
However, other costs may not be observed, for instance the possible failure of
attempts to access resources at the remote site while connected via VPN. Not
only is the policy-maker unable to judge the effort available for compliance, but
also the effort required to comply is uncertain. In our model, updating preference
with loadn(φ) reflects the willingness of a user to deviate from prior preference
in favour of compliance up to n times. ModelM′ contains a preference structure
for each n, that is, for each possible value of the (unmeasurable) compliance
budget. A highly compliant user (n = 2 in this example) becomes indifferent
between histories 1–3. A user with low compliance budget (n = 1) retains just the
preference for history 2 over the fully-compliant 1. Thus for the highly compliant
user, preference and policy are aligned, so there is no reason to violate the
policy. For the less compliant user, after the first VPN connection the budget is
exhausted and the user prefers to revert to SSH, contravening the policy.
The scenario we have modelled ascribes at least some propensity for com-
pliance to the user: we do not include load0(φ) in the set of preference update
formulae. As a result, we are able to draw some conclusions about the preferences
of the user under the policy φ. For instance, each of the histories 1–3 satisfies
H, 0 |=M [!Φ](cdS → ¬(¬ddS U aH ∧©(¬ddS U aH)));
that is, the user would never prefer to adopt a behaviour incorporating two
accesses to high-security resources via SSH.
5 Further work: incomplete information reasoning
Our model of the compliance budget has been designed to account for the fact
that the ‘budget’ is not a quantifiable value, and the rate at which it is depleted
is unknown, as explained in [6,7]. This has led to a model in which we have,
for each agent, a set of possible preference relations over histories. That is, our
model incorporates uncertainty about the preferences of the agents: we know
that eventually the compliance budget will be exhausted, but we do not know
how long that will take. The impact of imposing a new policy φ is modelled by
updating the agents’ preferences with loadn(φ) for an uncertain value of n.
Uncertainty over preferences is the qualitative analogue of uncertainty over
payoffs. Harsanyi [13] demonstrates that all uncertainty over the structure of
a game can be reduced to uncertainty over payoffs. Our model is therefore a
simple qualitative setting in which to study situations of incomplete information.
Security policy decisions are typically incomplete information situations because
of uncertainty over the compliance budget of agents. As Harsanyi’s reduction
suggests, this uncertainty subsumes lack of knowledge of the consequences of
compliance on productivity. In the VPN example, the policy-maker insisting on
VPN for remote access is not aware of the implications for individual agents,
who may have difficulty accessing local resources (e.g., network printers) while
connected to a VPN. Such issues may or may not be the reason that compliance
is reduced, but, in our model, it does not matter: uncertainty in the compliance
budget accounts for uncertainty over the details of agent behaviour, allowing us
to model behaviour at an appropriate level of abstraction.
Much work remains, including: the metatheory of the logic and the theory of
load formulae (e.g., for the interaction of multiple policies); other logics, such as
epistemic variants to internalize uncertainty (note that history-based semantics
supports epistemic constructions [19]); decision- and game-theoretic considera-
tions such as optimality and equilibria; consideration of richer and larger models
in order to explore the value of the approach for security policy-makers.
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